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ABSTRACT 
 
We study the determinants of life span of convertible bonds issued between 1980 and 
1998.  About 60% of the bonds survive either to a call or to their maturity. The issuers 
of the remaining bonds are delisted during the life of their bonds. Calls and delistings 
shorten the average life span of convertibles from the original 17 years to an effective 
life span of only 7 years. Issuer’s post-issuance performance and investment behavior 
affect the effective life of convertibles.  Our results support the sequential financing 
hypothesis, as bonds issued by firms with speedier investment schedules have shorter 
life spans.  
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1. Introduction 
 Two points in the life cycle of convertible bonds have received lively research interest, 
namely their birth in issuance, and their “death” through a call. However, besides recent studies 
by King and Mauer (2012), and Grundy and Verwijmeren (2012), few papers consider the entire 
life cycle of convertible bonds and the joint determinants of their tenure. We aim to fill that gap 
with this study. We track the life of a convertible bond sample that was initially issued between 
1981 and 1998, and study determinants of the effective life of those bonds. 
 Our study has two main goals. First, we seek to provide information concerning factors 
that affect the end of life for these bonds.  How common is it for them to be called vs. how many 
of them mature as bonds?  How many of them cease to exist for other reasons, such as mergers 
and firm failures?  Secondly, we observe certain design features in convertible bonds, and relate 
those design features to existing literature that motivates their usage.  Features such as 
conversion premium, coupon rate, maturity, callability and call protection all come with potential 
costs and benefits.  We seek to evaluate how the use of these design features is related to the 
subsequent behavior of the issuing firms.  The existing studies on call policy of convertible 
bonds focus on factors such as yield differential and conversion premium as determinants of call 
policy.  Our focus is different, as we measure the calendar time that the bonds remain active 
beyond their call protection period.  Our results should be of interest to convertible bond 
investors such as commercial banks, whose ability to remain invested in the issue is limited after 
a forced conversion to equity, and to hedge funds holding a convertible bond as one leg in a 
convertible arbitrage portfolio. For both groups, an unexpected shortening of the life of a 
convertible bond would present unexpected transaction costs. 
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 Our results indicate that many convertible bond issuers are delisted during the life of the 
convertible.  Out of our 955 sample bonds, only 60% remain active to either a call announcement 
or to original maturity.  Over 65% of the delistings, counting for about 26% of the original 
sample, occur due to mergers, while about 12% of the original sample is either liquidated or 
dropped by the stock exchange. Both calls and delistings have the effect of significantly 
shortening the effective life span of convertible bonds. For the overall sample, the effective life 
span falls from an original time to maturity of about 17 years to a realized life span of about 7 
years.  In observing the connection between the design of convertible bonds and their eventual 
life cycle, we exclude bonds whose issuers are delisted, as we assume that mergers and 
bankruptcies are not foreseen at the time of the issuance.  
 We find that features in the original bond design have a limited effect on the length of the 
bond’s life. Bonds with longer original maturities survive longer as bonds, and bonds with higher 
(original) yield advantage tend to be called sooner. Call protection type and conversion premium 
fail to affect the bonds’ life cycle in a consistent manner. Issuer’s performance after issuance, 
however, has a significant effect on the life span of the convertible. Higher post issuance stock 
returns shorten the life of convertibles, and improvements in an issuer’s credit rating have a 
similar effect.  
 Most interestingly, firms with high capital expenditures subsequent to issuance call their 
bonds sooner. That finding is consistent with the sequential financing hypothesis, forwarded by 
Mayers (1998).  Using three different measures suggested by Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) to 
gauge convertible issuers’ post-issuance investment activity, we find that firms with speedier 
investment schedules tend to call their bonds more quickly.  The connection between the bond’s 
tenure and its issuer’s subsequent capital investments is robust to controlling for several issue, 
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issuer and market characteristics, including the variables noted above, and factors such as 
issuers’ Tobin’s Q at issuance and issuers’ stock return volatility after issuance.  
 Our regressions with sub-samples that are specific to certain security design features show 
that the connection between the length of convertible bond life cycle and issuer’s capital 
expenditure growth is present in samples with different call protection types and in different time 
sub-samples. When we study sub-samples that are based on whether the issue is an equity-like or 
a debt-like convertible, as defined in Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003), we find that the 
connection between life span beyond call protection and investment growth is present only in the 
debt-like convertible bond sample. This suggests that with equity-like convertibles, issuance 
motives other than sequential financing play an important role.1   
 
 
2. Determinants of issuance and calling of convertible bonds 
 
2.1 Issuance motives 
 The literature provides several different motivations for issuance of convertible bonds.  
The proposed motives are not mutually exclusive, and empirical studies have failed to provide 
conclusive evidence for one being more important than the others in motivating convertible bond 
usage.  Green (1984) and Mikkelson (1980) highlight the value of convertibles in incentive 
alignment among security holders.  At issuance, the conversion feature reduces the risk inherent 
in bonds, and thus can entice investors to invest (Brennan and Schwartz, 1988).  Lewis, 
Rogalski, and Seward (2003) find that convertible bond issuers have better investment 
                                                 
1 Brown, Grundy, Lewis, and Verwijmeren (2012) report that convertibles that are privately issued to hedge funds 
tend to be very equity-like. It is safe to assume that for such bonds, the connection to issuer’s capital expenditure 
growth would be weaker. 
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opportunities but lower investment growth, which leads them to suggest that convertible debt 
alleviates overinvestment problems. 
 Stein (1992) suggests the use of convertibles as backdoor equity.  Firms that ultimately 
want to issue equity resort to convertibles because equity is prohibitively expensive for them to 
issue.  Convertibles can also satisfy an investor’s appetite for equity. Papers by Brown, Grundy, 
Lewis, and Verwijmeren (2012) and de Jong, Dutordoir, and Verwijmeren (2011) focus on the 
recent expansion of private (144A) issues in the convertible market.  They suggest that firms 
issue convertibles privately to hedge funds engaging in convertible arbitrage.  The firms save on 
issuance costs, compared to a public seasoned equity offering, while enabling hedge funds to 
form arbitrage portfolios consisting of convertible bonds and short positions in the underlying 
stock.2  Lewis and Verwijmeren (2011) note the speed of financial engineering, continuously 
creating new issue features in hybrid securities such as convertible bonds.  For example, towards 
the latter part of their sample that runs from 2000 to 2007, more than half of the convertible 
bonds are cash-settled – a feature that was non-existent during our sample years.  
 Convertibles have also been suggested as vehicles to finance sequential financing needs 
(Mayers, 1998; Wang, 2009).  The sequential financing motivation of convertible issuance 
suggests that due to agency costs between management and investors, financing is obtained 
gradually.  The firm issues a convertible bond to finance the first sequence, and then, at the time 
the firm is ready for the following sequence, it forces conversion of the convertible, reducing 
debt on the balance sheet, which allows financing of the next sequence. 
 
2.2 Call determinants 
                                                 
2 Evidence of such convertible arbitrage is reported already much earlier by Brent, Morse, and Stice (1990), who 
report higher levels of short interest in the stock of firms with convertible bonds outstanding.   
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 Under perfect market assumptions, the firm should call its convertible bond as soon as the 
conversion value of the bond reaches the stated call price (Ingersoll, 1977; Brennan and 
Schwartz, 1977).  When the value of the bond exceeds the conversion value, a potential for 
wealth transfer from bond holders to stock holders exists, which increases management’s 
incentive to place a call (Byrd, Mann, Moore, and Ramanlal, 1998).  However, the notice period 
between the call announcement and the time of eventual conversion/redemption limits 
management’s ability to transfer wealth.  As opposed to conversion to equity, redemption by 
convertible holders requires cash, and couldeven jeopardize the financial health of the firm 
(Jaffee and Shleifer, 1990).  Paired with the higher transaction costs of redemption, firms 
predominantly call their convertibles only when a sufficient safety premium exists.  Asquith and 
Mullins (1991) cite a conversion premium of 20 to 25 percent as the premium “most often 
mentioned by investment banks”.  Call protection terms and safety cushion account for a large 
portion of the observed premium (Asquith, 1995).  
 The difference between the coupon interest of the bond and the dividend yield of the stock 
should be a significant factor in the firm’s incentives to call the bond.  When a dividend yield 
advantage exists, the firm may let the bond remain uncalled.  In such case, savvy investors will 
voluntarily convert to equity, which saves the firm transaction costs, while “sleeping” investors 
will fail to notice the yield differential (Constantinides and Grundy, 1987). Recent findings by 
Grundy and Verwijmeren (2012) support the importance of yield advantage in explaining earlier 
reported delays to call convertible bonds. They find that dividend protection, which has become 
a common feature in more recent convertible bond issues, and abolishes the effects that 
dividends would have on investors’ conversion decision, has reduced call delays significantly. 
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2.3 The life cycle of convertible bonds 
 Few studies consider the life cycle of convertible bonds in its entirety. Asquith (1995) 
studies convertible bonds issued between 1980 and 1982 to determine whether the call policies 
used by the issuing firms are optimal.  More recently, King and Mauer (2012) and Grundy and 
Verwijmeren (2012) use a similar strategy. These works focus on the determinants of the call 
policy, with less emphasis on the security design.  Bhabra and Patel (1996) compare convertible 
bonds that ultimately bring equity to the firm’s capital structure against those that fail to do so.  
They find that the two groups come with similar contract terms, but that firms whose bonds 
remain bonds tend to be riskier, smaller, less profitable, and have lower market-to-book ratios.  
These findings lead Bhabra and Patel (1996) to label the latter group 'mimickers'. 
 In the current study, we observe both the initial security design features and the subsequent 
call behavior.  We seek to explore the determinants of the length of the life cycle of convertible 
bonds, and both security design and call behavior should have an effect on it.  While most of the 
literature on calls of convertible bonds observes the relation between the firm’s stock price and 
the conversion price of its convertible bond, our main variable of interest is the time that the 
convertible bond remains as a bond.  Since call protection disallows the issuer to call the issue 
while the protection is in effect, we are interested in the time period after the call protection has 
expired.  
 Sequential financing is forwarded by Mayers (1998) as an issuance motive for convertible 
bonds.  In sequential financing, the firm initially issues a convertible bond with an idea that once 
the next investment stage arrives, the firm can force conversion on its convertible, thereby 
cleaning up its balance sheet, which further allows a new issue to finance the following 
investment sequence.  Call provisions and call protection play crucial roles in security design for 
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firms that use convertibles for sequential financing. Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) provide 
evidence of a connection between the call protection period in convertible bonds, and their 
issuers’ investment behavior subsequent to the issue.  They report that firms whose subsequent 
capital expenditures grow faster tend to provide weaker call protection terms for their convertible 
bonds.  Besides the implied connection between call protection terms and expected timing of 
financing needs, the sequential financing hypothesis implies also that firms adjust their call 
behavior depending on their investment growth so that issuers with fast investment growth call 
their convertibles sooner.3  Building on the assumption that convertibles are used for sequential 
financing, we expect that firms with faster investment growth subsequent to the issue would call 
their bonds sooner, after controlling for call protection and factors that have been found to affect 
call delays in prior literature. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
 Most of the issue-specific data used in this study come from Securities Data Corporation's 
(SDC) New Issues database.  Altogether, SDC reports 4,262 convertible bond issues between 
1980 and 1998.  Tofocus on a relatively homogenous group of convertible bonds, we exclude all 
issues with the following characteristics from the sample: (1) original maturity of two years or 
less, (2) variable coupon rate (including reset issues), (3) issues exchangeable or convertible to a 
security other than the issuing company's common stock, (4) issues that were combined with 
                                                 
3  This latter point is challenged by Alderson, Betker, and Stock (2006), who report that investment behavior of 
convertible issuers who force conversion on their convertibles is not different from those convertible issuers who 
call their convertibles out of the money.  However, a recent study by Chen, Mao, and Wang (2010) provides a 
rationale for a connection between investment patterns and call behavior even in the absence of a conversion option, 
suggesting that calls of out-of-the-money convertibles could also be motivated by increasing investments by the 
firm. 
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other types of securities.  Also, issues for which neither SDC, issuance announcements on Lexis-
Nexis Academic Universe, SEC's Edgar database nor Moody's Industrial Manuals provide call 
protection terms were rejected. For the remaining sample, primary SIC codes were obtained from 
Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT database. After elimination of issuers with primary SIC codes 
between 6000 and 7000 (financial institutions), the final sample consists of 955 convertible bond 
issues. 
 As of 2007, nine years have passed since the last bond in this sample was issued. This 
allows us to observe a significant portion of their realized tenure. We gather information on 
which of our sample bonds have been called, and track issuers for potential delistings. We have 
identified call events from call announcements using the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe and 
Bloomberg.  The delistings are captured from the CRSP database, so that the issuer is classified 
as delisted if a delisting code appears for it in the CRSP database before either a call event or the 
maturity date of the convertible bond. If no call announcement for the bond can be found in 
either Lexis-Nexis or Bloomberg, and the issuer’s stock remains active according to CRSP, we 
classify the bond either as matured or as still running, depending on its original maturity.  At the 
end of 2007, 43 out of the original 955 bonds are still determined to be active.  Their continued 
existence is confirmed using Bloomberg.  
 Convertible bondscould retire prior to their maturity in ways other than through a call by 
the issuer. Besides termination of issuer’s stock through either a merger or a bankruptcy, Grundy 
and Verwijmeren (2012) note exchange offers by issuers, full exercises of put features and full 
voluntary conversions by investors as possible ways the life of a convertible bond may end. In 
this study, we have concentrated on calls and maturing bonds, while also capturing delistings due 
to various reasons. The above-mentioned alternative causes of convertible bond retirement are 
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relatively infrequent4, and besides exchange offers, they are outside the control of the bond 
issuer. 
 Table 1 provides information about our sample.  In Panel A, we segregate the delisted 
issues further, based on the delisting codes from CRSP. The most common reason for delistings 
is mergers.  About 66% of the delisted issuers disappear from the CRSP database for that reason.  
Numerous issuers also confront business difficulties, as 111 out of the total 379 delisted issuers 
are either liquidated or dropped by the stock exchange. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
 In Panel B of Table 1, we report the bond outcomes by their call protection types. Soft call 
protection is contingent on the issuer’s stock price.  For example, a convertible bond with a 140 
percent soft call protection is callable during the call protection period if the stock price is at 
least 40% above a predetermined price level for a set number of days.  Hard call protection 
dictates that the bond is not callable during the protection period.5  We classify bonds as having 
an absolute call protection if they have hard call protection for their entire life.6  Between the two 
most common call protection types, namely soft and hard call protection, calls are almost equally 
common, as 41% of bonds with soft call protection and 43% of bonds with hard call protection 
                                                 
4 In the Grundy and Verwijmeren (2012) sample (bonds issued between 2000 and 2006), 93% of the sample retires 
either through a call, a delisting, or is still running at the time of the observation.   
5 Convertible bond issuance is a field where active financial engineering activity produces new contract innovations 
(see Lewis and Verwijmeren, 2011).  Our sample precedes most recent innovations, such as cash settled issues and 
joint issues of convertibles and stock for convertible arbitrage demand by hedge funds (de Jong, Dutordoir, and 
Verwijmeren, 2011).  A significant change in contract design that occurs during our sample years is the emergence 
of call protection and shifting between soft and hard call protection terms (Korkeamäki and Moore, 2004).  We 
consider different call protection terms separately, and also include issue year dummies in our regression analysis to 
control for potential unobserved time-dependent heteroskedasticity in security design features.  
6 Since bonds with absolute call protection allow neither security design nor firm behavior to play a role in the 
bonds’ life span, we exclude the nine bonds with absolute call protection that are not delisted from our regression 
analysis in Section 4. 
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are called.  Issuers who offered soft call protection on their bonds have been delisted somewhat 
more commonly, whereas running to maturity is more common among hard call protection, and 
even more so among bonds with absolute call protection.   
 In Panel C of Table 1, we report the original maturity and the realized effective life span of 
our sample bonds, by call protection type, and by whether the bonds end up being called or not. 
The effective life span of the bonds is severely shorter than the original tie to maturity. It appears 
that both calls and delistings have a similar effect on shortening of the bonds’ life span. The 
average effective life span for called bonds falls from the original 17.16 years to the realized 7.09 
years. For the non-called bonds the corresponding figures are 16.59 years, and 7.38 years. The 
latter group includes bonds that are delisted. Consistent with our evidence, Brown, Grundy, 
Lewis, and Verwijmeren (2012) report that 13.38% of their sample of convertibles issued 
between 2000 and 2008 are outstanding after 5 years. 
 Finally, in Panel D of Table 1, we compare the length of the call protection period and the 
eventual life span past the protection period between bonds with soft and hard call protection.  
Panel D only includes bonds that either matured (or continue to be active at the end of 2007) or 
were called.  No marked differences exist between the two call protection types, with the 
exception that among those bonds that are called, bonds with hard call protection are called 
somewhat sooner after the protection period expires. The difference is slightly more substantial 
than it appears, as some of the bonds with soft protection are actually called during their 
protection period, as King and Mauer (2012) report.  
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4. Determinants of convertible bond life span 
 In this section, we turn to regression analysis to study determinants of the tenure of 
convertible bonds.  
 
4.1 Variables used in the regression analysis 
 As Asquith (1995) and numerous subsequent authors point out the importance of call 
protection in lengthening the life of convertible callable bonds, our main interest is in the bonds’ 
tenure past their call protection period.  Therefore, in our regression specifications, the dependent 
variable is set to capture the length of the time period after the bond’s call protection expires.  
We do not rely on the first call information in the SDC database because for bonds with soft call 
protection, first call is typically defined to equal the issue date.  We specify our dependent 
variable PASTPROT as follows: 
 
  PASTPROT = log[1 + tend – tprot],      (1)  
 
where tend represents the time from issuance to either the bond’s call date or maturity, whichever 
is sooner, and tprot is the time from issuance to the end of the bond’s call protection period.  For 
bonds that remain active at the end of 2007, we assume that they continue to run through their 
maturity.  Our aim is to observe the effects that both the initial design, and the call policy 
determinants have on the tenure of convertible bonds.  Therefore, our regression analysis 
excludes bonds that are eventually delisted, under the assumption that their delistings were not 
foreseen and predicted at the time of the issuance7. 
                                                 
7 As mentioned above, mergers are the most common reason for delistings. The treatment of convertible bonds in 
mergers varies. Some are retired and some are assumed by the acquiring firm.With some of the issues that are 
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 Most of the independent variables in our regressions are motivated by prior studies on call 
policy of convertible callable bonds.  Conversion premium is the key variable in most prior 
studies, and we expect bonds with higher original conversion premium (CONVPREM) to live 
longer.  A yield advantage of the bond over the underlying stock could cause the firm to rush 
calling its convertible.  Accordingly, a high yield advantage (YIELDA) should shorten a bond’s 
life.8  Firms with greater stock returns after the issuance will have the conversion options in their 
convertible bonds in-the-money sooner.  As issuers are thus able to force conversion sooner, this 
could shorten the time to call.  We measure post-issuance returns with variable RET, which 
captures the issuers’ cumulative stock returns during the 500 trading days (2 years) following the 
issuance.9  Stock volatility could induce firms to allow an additional safety premium to 
accumulate before mounting a call on their convertible bond. We control for that effect with the 
variable POSTVOL, which represents the standard deviation of the issuer’s stock returns, 
measured during the 250 trading days after the issuance. 
 High coupon (COUPON) bonds are less likely to offer a yield advantage, but they are also 
more likely to be called for refinancing, which should further shorten the life of those bonds.  
Decreases in corporate bond yields will also induce some issuers to call their bonds for 
refinancing.  We control for that effect with the variable RATECHG, which measures the change 
in Moody’s AAA corporate bond yield index from issuance to three years after it.10 At the firm 
                                                                                                                                                             
acquired prior to a call or maturity, we are able to determine that the bond continues its life after the deal. However, 
it is difficult to track all of the bonds in a consistent manner through a merger. We have therefore decided to discard 
those bonds from our regression samples. 
8 While most of our issue-specific data come from the SDC, we have used Compustat as a secondary data source in 
cases where SDC reports missing data points.  Yield advantage is missing for a large number of our sample bonds in 
the SDC database, which is why we have used SDC’s original yield minus Compustat’s dividend yield at issuance as 
our proxy of yield advantage. 
9 We also use the five-year post-issuance return as an alternative measure. 
10 Data come from The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  We use annual averages of the index.  The three-year 
time window is motivated by the normal call protection period being around three years.  However, using 5-year 
changes instead of 3-year changes yields identical inferences. 
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level, improvements in the issuer’s credit rating could allow refinancing at a lower rate, and thus 
provide a motive for an earlier call of the convertible. We obtain issuers’ Moody’s credit ratings 
three years after the issuance from Thomson One, and compare them to the same ratings at 
issuance, as reported by the SDC New Issues database. The credit rating improves for 43 bonds 
in our sample, and deteriorates for 16 of them. We use an indicator variable for positive rating 
changes (RATING+) to control for any effect that they would have on the firms’ call behavior. 
Some of the calls may be motivated by a large amount of voluntary conversion, in which case the 
company would institute a so-called “clean up” call. By controlling for the amount of the issue 
outstanding at the time of the call (OUTSTANDING = amount outstanding at call/original 
proceeds), we control for that effect.    
 Given that we measure the time between the end of the call protection period and either 
call or maturity with our dependent variable, it is obvious that the bond’s original maturity 
affects that measure.  We include the variable LOGMAT (defined as log(1 + time between call 
protection end and maturity) ) to capture the effect of original time to maturity on the realized 
maturity.  
 Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) provide evidence of sequential financing by showinga 
connection between convertible bonds’ call protection and issuers’ subsequent investment 
behavior. While we control for call protection type with the variable PROTTYPE (takes on 
values of zero for no protection, one for soft protection, two for hard protection, and three for 
absolute protection), we also include measures of the issuer’s investment behavior after the 
issuance.  Following Korkeamaki and Moore (2004), our variable CAPRATE is defined as 
follows. 
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  CAPRATE = (C1/A1) + (C2/A2)/2 + ... + (C5/A5)/5,   (2) 
 
where Ci = capital expenditures in each year i following the issuance, and Ai = total assets at the 
end of each year i, i = 1, ..., 5.  Firms with high investments occurring soon after the issuance 
exhibit high CAPRATE values, and are more likely to call sooner, which, according to the 
sequential financing hypothesis makes them ready to finance their next investment sequence. 
Therefore, a high CAPRATE value should shorten the bond’s life. Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward 
(2003) motivate measurement of convertible bond issuers' behavior relative to their industry. 
Thus, we also define  a version of the CAPRATE measure where each year’s industry median 
(Ct/At) is subtracted from the firm-level observation as our main measure of a firms’ post-
issuance investment behavior.11 We denote the industry-adjusted measure as CAPRATEIND. 
Some of the firms in our regression sample (53 out of 447 firms), discontinue reporting capital 
expenditures in Compustat at some point after the issuance. While our main sample consists of 
only firms with available capital expenditures throughout the CAPRATE measurement period, 
we consider among our robustness tests a possibility that capital expenditures are not reported 
because they do not exist.  
 As an alternative proxy for post-issuance investment growth, we use TIMING, which is 
also defined and used by Korkeamaki and Moore (2004).  For TIMING, we calculate the issuer’s 
cumulative capital expenditures for the five years following the issuance, and then track when 
those expenditures surpass the proceeds of the issue.  TIMING is the number of years when the 
cumulative capital expenditures exceed the proceeds from the convertible.  Thus, TIMING varies 
from 1 to 5. 
                                                 
11 Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) consider this industry-adjusted CAPRATE measure in one of their robustness 
tests. 
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 Finally, we include a size proxy (log(total assets)), measures of relative proceeds 
(proceeds/total assets), and leverage (total debt/total assets), and a growth option proxy 
(log(Tobin’s Q)) as control variables. They are all commonly used proxies in studies of 
convertible bond calls.  Time variation affects several variables in our models through business 
cycles.  Also, convertible bond issuance activity (see our Table 1), usage of call protection (see 
Korkeamaki and Moore, 2004), and other innovations in convertible bond design (see Lewis and 
Verwijmeren, 2011) introduce time variation into our sample.  To ensure that such variation does 
not cause our models to be biased, we use issue-year dummies in all of our regression 
specifications.  In the interest of space, we do not report the coefficient values for the issue-year 
dummies in our tables.12 
 
4.2 Regression results 
 We begin the regression analysis of our data in Table 2.  In column (1), we show our base 
model, where all the aforementioned control variables are included. We are measuring the post-
issuance investment growth with the variant of the CAPRATE variable that excludes firms that 
fail to report a value for capital expenditures in any of the five years subsequent to the issue. Not 
surprisingly, the bond’s original time to maturity past call protection is positively related to its 
eventual life span. The coefficient for protection type is negative albeit statistically insignificant. 
Although Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) show that protection type is related to a firms’ 
subsequent investment growth so that firms with faster investment growth provide weaker call 
protection, our results indicate that bonds’ tenure past their call protection period is somewhat 
                                                 
12  Additional variables that we have considered in unreported regressions include change in assets in the year of the 
issuance (motivated by Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward, 2003), market-to-book in years after the issuance (motivated 
by King and Mauer, 2012 as a control for agency issues related to the call decision), and an indicator for private 
issues (motivated by different motives for issues directed to institutional investors, e.g., in de Jong, Dutordoir, and 
Verwijmeren, 2011).  Inclusion of these additional variables leaves our reported findings intact. 
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shorter for bonds with stronger call protection.  As expected, yield advantage is inversely related 
to the bond’s life span beyond its call protection, indicating that bonds that offer higher yields 
than their underlying stocks tend to be called sooner. The indicator for positive credit rating 
changes enters with a strong negative coefficient, supporting the notion that firms that experience 
improvements in their credit terms call their outstanding convertible bonds sooner. Our test 
variable CAPRATE enters with a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that firms that 
invest sooner appear to be calling their bonds sooner. In summary, besides the original maturity, 
other security design features seem to play a very minor role in determining the life span of 
convertible bonds beyond their call protection period. Meanwhile, the firm’s post-issuance 
success, measured by stock returns, credit rating changes, and investment growth seem to be 
important determinants of the bond’s life cycle. 
 In column (2), we re-estimate CAPRATE, assuming that a missing observation for capital 
expenditures in a year indicates that the firm had no capital expenditures that year. The sample 
grows by 53 observations, which indicates the number of firms with a missing value for capital 
expenditures in any of the five years subsequent to issuance. The connection between capital 
expenditure growth and the life span of the convertible is robust to this alternative definition. 
Among control variables, the original coupon rate and the post-issuance interest rate change 
enter now with a statistically significant positive sign and findings regarding yield advantage 
strengthen somewhat. Otherwise, the results are very similar between the first two columns of 
Table 2.  
 
Insert Table 2 
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 In column (3) of Table 2, we use TIMING as our measure of firms’ post-issuance 
investment behavior. The expectation for TIMING is the opposite to that of CAPRATE, as a 
larger value for TIMING indicates a slower accumulation of capital expenditure investments. 
The coefficient for TIMING is positive albeit not statistically significant. CAPRATE takes into 
account the investment growth relative to the whole firm, whereas TIMING relates capital 
expenditures to the size of the issue. This part of the effectcould be captured by the control 
variable for relative proceeds. The coefficient of TIMING strengthens when we leave 
PROCEEDS out of the regression, but it remains still slightly below the conventional levels of 
statistical significance (results not reported in detail). We will focus on the CAPRATE measure 
in our subsequent tests.  
 In column (4) of Table 2, we employ the industry-adjusted CAPRATE measure (referred to 
as CAPRATEIND), still assuming that non-reported capital expenditures mean no capital 
expenditures.  Compared to results in column (2), the inverse relation between capital 
expenditure growth and life span beyond call protection period gains additional statistical 
strength. In column (5) of Table 2, we rerun the column (1) specification while using five-year 
cumulative returns in place of the two-year returns considered earlier. Our results regarding 
CAPRATE become even stronger in this specification. 
   In column (6) of Table 2 we use an alternative, simpler dependent variable.  END is 
defined as the natural logarithm of (1 + time to end of life), where time to end-of-life is measured 
from issuance.  Therefore, END does not consider the call protection period in the way 
PASTPROT does.  This alternative dependent variable yields surprisingly similar results, 
compared to those reported earlier.  The only marked differences are that leverage enters now 
with a statistically significant coefficient, and the original maturity is no longer connected with 
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the life span of the bond. Our findings regarding CAPRATE remain intact, as firms with speedier 
investment schedules after issuance tend to have bonds with shorter life spans. Our results are 
not materially affected by the inclusion of year dummies in our regressions. The t-statistics for 
CAPRATE are 2.898 and 2.853, when PASTPROT or END is used as a dependent variable on 
regressions without year dummies, respectively. In the interest of space, we do not tabulate these 
regression results. 
 In summary, the results in Table 2 suggest that factors related to both optimal call policy 
and post-issuance growth of investment opportunities play an important effect on the life span of 
convertible bonds. The findings on yield advantage (YIELDA) and capital expenditure growth 
(CAPRATE/CAPRATEIND) are consistent across the specifications reported in Table 2. Also, 
the notion that convertible bond financing is used by marginal bond issuer receives support, as 
firms with good post-issuance performance and those firms whose credit rating improves tend to 
call their bonds sooner.  
 
4.3 Time variation in the connection between life span and investment growth 
 Our findings could be affected by changes in the structure of the convertible market and 
types of issues during our sample period.  For example, Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) report 
that the dominant type of call protection among U.S. issuers shifts from soft call protection to 
hard call protection around 1990. Recall the role of financial innovation in changing the 
landscape of the convertible bond market through time (Lewis and Verwijmeren, 2011). 
Although the issue-year dummies that we use in all of our regressions should reduce such 
concerns, we further evaluate whether any such changes in markets and bond design affects our 
findings reported above, by splitting our sample into two time periods.  In the first two columns 
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of Table 3, we rerun the regression specification from column (1) of Table 2, with time-specific 
sub-samples.  We divide our sample somewhat arbitrarily by including issues in years 1980-1986 
in column (1) of Table 3, and issues from 1987 to 1998 in column (2).13  Our findings regarding 
CAPRATE persist in both time periods, albeit the coefficient loses some of its size and statistical 
significance in the latter sub-sample.  Among other variables, relative proceeds and conversion 
premium are significant only in the earlier period, whereas yield advantage and post-issuance 
volatility are significant only in the latter period.  Also, the effect of post-issuance rating changes 
on the life span is much weaker in the latter period.  
 Another aspect that has changed drastically in the convertible bond market in the last few 
years is the prevalence of private issues, issued under rule 144A.  Brown, Grundy, Lewis, and 
Verwijmeren (2012) report that in the period from 2000 to 2008, 85% of convertible issues in the 
SDC database are private issues.  The behavior of these private issues might differ from the 
public market, as a large proportion of the investment in them comes from hedge funds that 
engage in convertible arbitrage (Brown, Grundy, Lewis, and Verwijmeren, 2012).  Within our 
sample, 153 issues, or about 16%, are private.  However, only four of those issues live to either a 
call announcement or maturity.  As mentioned above, in unreported tests we include a dummy 
variable for those issues.  The dummy enters with an insignificant coefficient in our regressions, 
and alternatively leaving those four issues out of our regression samples has no effect on our 
findings. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
                                                 
13 Even in these regressions, we include issue-year dummies to control for time variation within each sub-sample. 
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 We repeat some of the robustness tests from Table 2 also in the time-specific sub-samples. 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 indicate that accounting for industry-effects in investment growth 
by using industry-adjusted capital expenditures strengthens the connection between capital 
expenditure growth and convertible bond life span. In columns (5) and (6), the analysis is again 
repeated for END as the dependent variable. The results weaken, and for the latter time period, 
they are no longer statistically significant.   
 The evidence reported in Table 3 suggests that the relative importance of determinants of 
the life span of convertible bonds has varied somewhat through time. Factors related to firms’ 
post-issuance investment growth (CAPRATE/CAPRATEIND) and performance (RET and 
RATING+) have weakened over time, with rating changes losing their statistical significance in 
the latter half of our sample period. Also, the size of the issue affects its subsequent tenure only 
among earlier issues. In contrast, yield advantage (YIELDA) and post-issuance volatility 
(POSTVOL) have emerged as significant determinants of convertible bond life span during the 
latter part of our sample.  
 
4.4 Security design and the connection between life span and investment growth 
 Korkeamaki and Moore (2004) show that call protection type is related to the subsequent 
investment patterns of convertible issuers. While our evidence above suggests a minor role for 
call protection type in determining convertible bonds’ tenure past their call protection period, we 
next study further whether differences among bonds with different call protection types influence 
our findings.  In column (1) of Table 3, we exclude bonds that were issued without call 
protection, and thus include only bonds with either soft or hard call protection.14  As bonds 
without call protection are callable from their issue date, they could introduce a bias into our 
                                                 
14 Recall that all our regressions exclude bonds with absolute call protection. 
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measure of PASTPROT.  However, the results are very similar to those reported earlier, 
indicating that presence of bonds with no call protection does not affect our results.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
 In columns (2) and (3) of Table 3, we isolate the effects of call protection type choice by 
running regressions in sub-samples that include only convertible bonds with soft or hard 
protection, respectively.  Although the effects of some of our control variables, such as firm size, 
relative proceeds, and post-issuance volatility on convertible bond tenure seem to vary by call 
protection type, the effect of post-issuance capital expenditure growth remains intact in both sub-
samples. 
 Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003) argue that because convertible bonds contain 
numerous contract terms that can be used to adjust their implications, it is not meaningful to 
observe individual contract terms in isolation.  They propose compiling a single measure of 
likelihood of conversion to equity using the Black-Scholes model.  Their measure allows them to 
divide convertible bonds to equity-like and debt-like issues, where the latter group exhibits a 
lower likelihood of conversion.15  We follow Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003) work, and 
classify our convertibles as either bond-like or equity-like.16  Columns (4) and (5) of Table 3 
show the results for regressions with equity-like and debt-like sub-samples, respectively.  Unlike 
Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003), we find debt-like convertibles to be more common than 
                                                 
15 Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003) use the N(d2) measure from the Black-Scholes model to determine the 
likelihood of exercise of the conversion option by the convertible investor. The measure is thus a function of current 
underlying stock price, conversion price, risk-free rate, dividend yield, volatility of the underlying stock, and time to 
the bond’s maturity. 
16 Unlike Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003), who classify bonds with less than 40% conversion likelihood as 
debt-like and bonds with higher than 60% likelihood as equity-like, we cut off our sample at the 50% point. We 
confirm the Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003) notion that varying the cut-off points does not have marked effects 
on the inferences. 
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equity-like convertibles in our sample.  The two convertible types appear to differ markedly 
when it comes to determinants of their life span.  Ex-post returns and rating changes are 
statistically significant determinants of bond life span only among debt-like convertibles, and the 
same holds also for our test variable, CAPRATE.  In the equity-like sub-sample, CAPRATE 
exhibits a positive, albeit insignificant coefficient. It is feasible that sequential financing is not an 
important issuance motive for equity-like convertibles. Bonds with a higher likelihood of 
conversion to equity may, for example, be bonds that are used more often in convertible 
arbitrage, as Brown, Grundy, Lewis, and Verwijmeren (2012) suggest. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 We study the life cycle of convertible bonds issued between 1980 and 1998 by U.S. firms. 
Our aim is to study how both security design features and the firms’ subsequent performance and 
investment behavior affect the bonds’ tenure.  Secondly, we report the life span of the sample of 
955 convertible bonds issued during our sample period. 
 We find that design features, such as call protection type, coupon rate, and yield advantage 
at issuance have a significant effect on the life span of convertible bonds.  We further find that 
the firm’s post-issuance performance is inversely related to convertible bonds’ life span. Namely, 
bonds issued by firms with greater post-issuance stock returns and firms with positive credit 
rating changes tend to live a shorter period after their call protection expires. Our most 
interesting finding is that firms with heavy investment schedules soon after the issuance tend to 
have bonds with shorter life spans.  This is consistent with the sequential financing hypothesis 
(Mayers, 1998). 
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 In checking the robustness of our findings, we confirm that our results are similar when we 
use alternative measures of the life span of our sample bonds, and they also persist in sub-
samples based on time, call protection type, and more general security design measure by Lewis, 
Rogalski, and Seward (2003).   
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Table 1 
 
Characteristics of the sample by bond outcome and protection type 
 
Panel A: Outcomes and delisting information 
Total Issues  955 
Called  400 
Non-called: active through maturity or "now" 176 
 Merged 249 
 exchanged for other issues 19 
 liquidations 2 
 dropped by stock exchange 109 
 
Panel B: Outcomes by call protection type 
Call Protection Type No Protection Soft Hard Absolute Total 
Delisted 41 156 180 2 379 
Not called 16 58 93 9 176 
Called 43 149 208 0 400 
  Total 100 363 481 11 955 
 
Panel C: Average original and effective realized life span by call protection 
type and by outcome (in years) 
Call Protection Type  All Soft Hard 
Avg. orig. life span Called 17.16 20.23 13.40 
 Non-called 16.59 21.08 14.70 
Avg. effective life span Called 7.09 7.78 6.75 
  Non-called 7.38 6.43 6.29 
 
Panel D: Average protection period and life span past protection 
period by call protection type and by outcome (in years) 
Call Protection Type  Soft Hard 
Avg. protection length Called 2.54 2.87 
 Non-called 2.67 2.73 
Avg. life past 
protection Called 2.82 1.85 
  Non-called 6.35 5.58 
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Table 2  
 
Regression results 
 
The dependent variable PASTPROT is defined as log(1+ (time(in years) to end of life minus time to end of protection)).  END 
is defined as log(1+time to end of life).  For called bonds, end of life is the call date; for matured bonds it is the maturity date.  
LOGSIZE is log(total assets in year of issuance).  LOGMAT is log(1+(time to maturity – time to end of call protection). 
PROCEEDS is the ratio of proceeds to total assets.  PROTTYPE is defined as 0 if there is no call protection, 1 if call 
protection is soft, 2 if it is hard, and 3 if it is absolute.  CONVPREM is the conversion premium at issuance.  LEVERAGE is 
the debt ratio in the year of issuance.  YIELDA is the issue’s yield advantage when new.  RET is the cumulative raw returns 
during the 500 trading days (2 years) after issue, and RET5 is a similar measure for 5 years.  COUPON is the coupon rate.  
CAPRATE is a 5-year weighted average of capital expenditures, and CAPRATEIND is the difference to the industry median 
for the same measure. TIMING is the number of years it takes for the issuers to spend the issuance proceeds on capital 
expenditures. POSTVOL is the standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year after issuance.  LOGQ is log (Tobin’s Q).  
RATECHG is the change in Moody’s AAA corporate bond index yields in three years following the issuance. 
OUTSTANDING is the amount of the issue outstanding at call/issuance amount. RATING+ is an indicator variable for those 
issuers whose Moody’s credit rating improves from issuance to three years after issuance. Robust t-statistics in parentheses.  * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables PASTPROT PASTPROT PASTPROT PASTPROT PASTPROT END 
       
LOGSIZE 0.0432 0.0368 0.0516 0.0314 0.0229 0.0333 
 (0.699) (0.620) (0.849) (0.530) (0.379) (0.844) 
LOGMAT 0.3673*** 0.2797** 0.2818** 0.2823** 0.3664*** 0.0168 
 (3.288) (2.547) (2.585) (2.578) (3.296) (0.261) 
PROCEEDS 0.5956 0.9061 0.7430 0.8883 0.6165 0.4032 
 (0.983) (1.594) (1.227) (1.572) (1.004) (1.050) 
PROTTYPE -0.0274 -0.0831 -0.0753 -0.0860 -0.0699 0.0913 
 (-0.220) (-0.642) (-0.576) (-0.665) (-0.560) (1.300) 
CONVPREM 0.4093 0.4433 0.4427 0.4233 0.3690 0.2922 
 (0.927) (1.022) (1.017) (0.971) (0.779) (0.829) 
LEVERAGE 0.5628 0.3619 0.3268 0.3597 0.7178* 0.4490* 
 (1.403) (0.873) (0.780) (0.867) (1.811) (1.830) 
YIELDA -0.0736* -0.0956** -0.1011** -0.0943** -0.0944** -0.0624** 
 (-1.849) (-2.386) (-2.500) (-2.347) (-2.383) (-2.293) 
RET -0.3530*** -0.3692*** -0.3828*** -0.3623***  -0.2259*** 
 (-3.043) (-3.264) (-3.322) (-3.220)  (-3.229) 
RET5     -0.0839***  
     (-2.694)  
COUPON 0.0395 0.0879* 0.0937* 0.0887* 0.0517 0.0415 
 (0.738) (1.666) (1.763) (1.690) (0.935) (1.227) 
CAPRATE -0.3925*** -0.2486**   -0.4583*** -0.2080** 
 (-2.781) (-2.231)   (-3.812) (-2.342) 
TIMING   0.0291    
   (0.857)    
CAPRATEIND    -0.2249***   
    (-2.802)   
POSTVOL 0.5852 0.5669 0.6315 0.5265 0.7653* 0.2115 
 (1.283) (1.320) (1.490) (1.225) (1.733) (0.794) 
LOGQ 0.2105 0.2177 0.2069 0.2269 0.2437 0.1335 
 (1.169) (1.257) (1.175) (1.310) (1.204) (1.217) 
RATECHG 0.2112 0.2553* 0.2611* 0.1740 -0.0273 0.0674 
 (1.435) (1.868) (1.877) (1.222) (-0.215) (0.737) 
OUTSTANDING -0.0143 -0.0827 -0.0723 -0.0768 0.0085 -0.1039 
 (-0.056) (-0.327) (-0.289) (-0.304) (0.034) (-0.797) 
RATING+ -0.6554*** -0.4615** -0.4565** -0.4578** -0.6955*** -0.2368** 
 (-2.735) (-2.210) (-2.138) (-2.197) (-2.828) (-1.985) 
CONSTANT -0.3079 -0.3113 -0.5552 -0.5784 -1.0120 1.2510* 
 (-0.314) (-0.317) (-0.559) (-0.588) (-1.036) (1.791) 
Issue-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 394 447 447 447 394 411 
Adjusted R2 0.237 0.201 0.196 0.204 0.217 0.158 
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Table 3 
 
Regression for time-specific subsamples 
 
The variables are defined in Table 2. The dependent variable is PASTPROT in columns (1)-(4), and 
END in columns (5) and (6).  Year<1987 are those issued before 1987, and Year>1986 are those 
issued after 1986.   Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)    
Variables Year<1987 Year>1986 Year<1987 Year>1986 Year<1987 Year>1986    
          
LOGSIZE 0.1070 0.0147 0.0945 0.0139 0.0770 0.0150    
 (1.196) (0.180) (1.054) (0.171) (1.275) (0.301)    
LOGMAT 0.4092*** 0.3382* 0.4202*** 0.3377* 0.0038 0.0356    
 (2.699) (1.886) (2.860) (1.879) (0.039) (0.346)    
PROCEEDS 1.3408* -0.5074 1.2833* -0.5036 0.8263* -0.1818    
 (1.879) (-0.490) (1.832) (-0.487) (1.708) (-0.328)    
PROTTYPE -0.1363 0.1473 -0.1514 0.1404 0.0614 0.0832    
 (-0.921) (0.719) (-1.026) (0.686) (0.709) (0.722)    
CONVPREM 0.8050* -0.4590 0.7861 -0.4515 0.5100 -0.2247    
 (1.716) (-0.393) (1.651) (-0.385) (1.361) (-0.315)    
LEVERAGE 0.3955 0.7280 0.4192 0.7237 0.5807 0.3053    
 (0.650) (1.326) (0.686) (1.318) (1.424) (0.999)    
YIELDA 0.0316 -0.1234** 0.0341 -0.1210** -0.0180 -0.0813**    
 (0.506) (-2.392) (0.547) (-2.341) (-0.401) (-2.327)    
RET -0.5169*** -0.2917** -0.4788*** -0.2897** -0.3842*** -0.1571**    
 (-4.330) (-2.078) (-3.917) (-2.057) (-4.966) (-2.342)    
COUPON -0.0261 0.0836 -0.0262 0.0866 0.0165 0.0513    
 (-0.342) (1.149) (-0.354) (1.187) (0.323) (1.239)    
CAPRATE -0.5791** -0.2971**   -0.3134** -0.1178    
 (-2.531) (-2.006)   (-2.108) (-1.460)    
CAPRATEIND   -0.5451*** -0.2274**      
   (-3.580) (-2.470)      
POSTVOL -0.3777 1.1406** -0.3697 1.0769** -0.4216 0.5510*    
 (-0.503) (2.156) (-0.503) (2.001) (-0.856) (1.788)    
LOGQ 0.3336 0.2172 0.3588 0.2245 0.3061 0.0116    
 (1.250) (0.920) (1.357) (0.949) (1.650) (0.106)    
RATECHG 0.1168 0.2766 0.1150 0.1489 0.0341 0.0902    
 (0.983) (1.160) (0.999) (0.597) (0.489) (0.701)    
OUTSTANDING 0.1234 -0.0746 0.1604 -0.0701 0.0287 -0.1762    
 (0.379) (-0.156) (0.494) (-0.146) (0.162) (-0.836)    
RATING+ -0.7566** -0.5961 -0.7417** -0.5888 -0.3633** -0.1511    
 (-2.558) (-1.589) (-2.520) (-1.567) (-2.176) (-0.965)    
CONSTANT -1.4984 0.2675 -1.5759 -0.0476 0.5248 1.8803*    
 (-1.292) (0.157) (-1.355) (-0.028) (0.649) (1.802)    
Issue Year 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   
Observations 211 183 211 183 221 190    
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.244 0.157 0.245 0.139 0.232    
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Table 4 
 
Regression for security design-specific sub-samples 
 
The variables are as defined in Table 2.  The dependent variable is PASTPROT.  Column 1 represents bonds from 
the sample with either soft or hard call protection.  Columns 2 and 3 split the sample by soft or hard call 
protection.  Columns 4 and 5 split the sample by whether the bonds are closer to bonds or equity, in the manner of 
Lewis, Rogalski, and Seward (2003).  Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Call Protected Soft Protection Hard Protection Debt-like Equity-like 
      
LOGSIZE 0.0565 0.2044** -0.0459 -0.0904 0.0740 
 (0.892) (2.146) (-0.481) (-0.530) (0.994) 
LOGMAT 0.3083*** 0.2152 0.3635* 0.7107** 0.3633*** 
 (2.740) (1.486) (1.953) (2.628) (2.831) 
PROCEEDS 0.6981 2.1650** -1.4359 -2.2092 0.9276 
 (1.092) (2.498) (-1.306) (-0.535) (1.520) 
PROTTYPE 0.2929*   0.0679 -0.1526 
 (1.893)   (0.172) (-1.194) 
CONVPREM 1.0412* 1.5083*** 0.7666 0.1511 0.6039 
 (1.893) (2.621) (0.613) (0.240) (0.927) 
LEVERAGE 0.4528 0.0428 0.2511 -1.2675 0.5906 
 (1.070) (0.059) (0.475) (-0.687) (1.373) 
YIELDA -0.0742* 0.0246 -0.1171* -0.1492* -0.0676 
 (-1.809) (0.489) (-1.884) (-1.876) (-1.146) 
RET -0.3329*** -0.6544*** -0.2359** -0.0013 -0.3630*** 
 (-2.736) (-3.232) (-2.145) (-0.004) (-2.858) 
COUPON 0.0536 0.0063 0.1871** 0.1679 0.0308 
 (0.961) (0.070) (2.164) (1.254) (0.462) 
CAPRATE -0.4305*** -0.5882** -0.3286** 0.2620 -0.4152*** 
 (-2.780) (-2.052) (-2.105) (0.306) (-2.885) 
POSTVOL 0.7640* -0.7672 1.1683* -0.5173 0.6827 
 (1.657) (-1.013) (1.961) (-0.295) (1.292) 
LOGQ 0.0968 0.0825 0.3580 0.2694 0.2800 
 (0.504) (0.234) (1.316) (0.445) (1.400) 
RATECHG 0.0394 0.0015 0.4470** 0.7365** 0.1701 
 (0.230) (0.006) (2.057) (2.350) (1.082) 
OUTSTANDING -0.0057 0.0461 0.2247 -0.9124 0.1426 
 (-0.019) (0.125) (0.402) (-1.518) (0.492) 
RATING+ -0.6695** -0.5386 -0.6027 -0.9498 -0.6260** 
 (-2.530) (-1.473) (-1.602) (-1.096) (-2.347) 
CONSTANT -1.8977* -2.4969 -1.8480 1.5734 -0.8820 
 (-1.732) (-1.579) (-0.921) (0.595) (-0.751) 
Issue-Year 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 341 166 175 81 319 
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.213 0.261 0.104 0.246 
 
